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HAYNSWORTH AND PARKER: HISTORY
DOES LIVE AGAIN
JOEL B. GROSSMAN* and STEPHEN WASBY**
The recent defeats by the Senate of the nominations to the
Supreme Court of Judge G. Harold Carswell and Judge Clement
Haynsworth were only the second and third such defeats in the present
century, and but the tenth and eleventh in the history of the Court.'
Whether they will remain exceptions to the norm which permits the
President to choose nominees to the Court relatively unhindered, or
whether these cases augur a new era of confrontation between the
President and the Senate remains to be seen. We have elsewhere sought
to speculate on the broader meaning of these events.' In this paper we
have chosen to focus on the Haynsworth case because it affords a
fascinating parallel to the only other senatorial defeat of a Supreme
Court nominee in the twentieth century, that of Judge John Parker in
1930.1 A comparison of these two nominations provides a unique time
perspective to view the process of Senate confirmation. Both Parker
and Haynsworth were, at the time of their nominations, members of
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Both were attacked by the
NAACP and the labor unions on the ground that their decisions as
appellate judges on race and labor relations questions were illiberal. In
both cases the question arose of the proper role of an appellate court
judge-to follow Supreme Court decisions to the letter, or to embark
on their own in formulating policy responses.
There were, of course, differences as well. The margin of defeat of
the Parker nomination was slim. The 39-41 vote might easily have gone
the other way had Senator Hugo Black, himself later named to the
* Associate Professor of Political Science and Director, Center for Law and
Behavioral Science, University of Wisconsin.
** Associate Professor of Government, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale;
Russell Sage Fellow in Law and Social Science, University of Wisconsin, 1969-1970.
1. We exclude from this category the 1968 nomination of Abe Fortas as Chief
Justice. Although the nomination was, in effect, rejected by the Senate, it was technically
never acted upon since Fortas withdrew his name in the wake of a projected filibuster.
2. J. Grossman and S. Wasby, The Senate and the Selection of Supreme Court
Justices: Where Does the "Haynsworth" Affair Leave Us?, 1971 (manuscript in
progress).
3. It is ironic to note that, in also searching for parallels, Senator Eastland (D.
Miss.) invoked in behalf of Haynsworth the shade of Justice Brandeis, who, like
Haynsworth, had been attacked for being "insensitive to appearances."
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Court, switched his vote to create a tie-presumably to be broken in
Parker's favor by Vice-President Dawes. While there had also been
speculation prior to the Haynsworth vote that Vice-President Agnew
might have to break a tie in Haynsworth's favor, the defeat was more
decisive, 45-55. Other differences existed. Parker's nomination had
been adversely reported by the Judiciary Committee, 6-10, while
Haynsworth's had been favorably reported. 4 Also, while Parker was a
southerner chosen to replace another southerner who had retired
(Justice Sanford), Haynsworth, a southern conservative, was
nominated to replace a liberal Democrat who had been forced off the
bench by Republican-conservative led opposition. Finally the biggest
difference was that Haynsworth's nomination was contested not simply
in terms of role and ideology, as had Parker's-but also on matters of
judicial ethics as well.
An appraisal of the Parker and Haynsworth nomination fights
affords us the opportunity to re-examine the role of the Senate in
confirming judicial nominations. The constitutional prescription of
"advice and consent" has long since been recognized as at least
partially inaccurate. The Senate as a whole never advises a President on
whom to nominate, and only rarely refuses to consent. Individual
senators of the President's party wield substantial influence in the
nomination of lower federal court judges, to the point of being able to
block a nomination of which they disapprove and force a nomination
they desire. For most senators, judgeships represent prime patronage
opportunities. But Supreme Court nominations are widely accepted as
a presidential prerogative and individual senators do not expect much
consultation or influence in making an appointment.
Once a nomination is made, however, the Senate's role is
activated. But even here, tradition and the exigencies of practical
politics serve as limiting factors. Most senators at least publicly
subscribe to the notion that recruiting Supreme Court justices is a
presidential prerogative, and that the confirmation role of the Senate is
limited to reviewing thefitness of the nominee rather than his political
4. 72 CONG. REc. 8338 (1930).
5. The most comprehensive treatment of the Senate's role in judicial appointments
is J. HARRIS, TmE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE (1953). See also J. GROSSMAN,
LAWYERS AND JUDGES: THE ABA AND THE PouTICs OF JUDICIAL SELECTION (1965); W.
Burris, John J. Parker and Supreme Court Policy: A Case Study in Judicial Control,
1965 (Unpublished dissertation in University of North Carolina Library); A. TODD,
JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF Louis D. BRANDEIS (1964).
[Vol. 23
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desirability, his qualifications, or the wisdom of choosing him.
Individual senators are not, of course, bound by these norms, and
nominations are frequently challenged for reasons other than mere
fitness. But the Senate as a whole, with the exception of the Parker
case, has followed this norm. It should be added that there is bi-
partisan acceptance of this norm. Senators understand that all
Presidents make most of their judicial appointments from the ranks of
their own party, and there is little evidence of partisan opposition to
most nominations. Where there is overt opposition along party lines, it
tends to arise in support of another issue.
6
With these facts in mind, let us attempt a more systematic
appraisal. Our major concerns will be the political situation and
political factors which surrounded the controversies, the question of
judicial ethics, and, finally, the question of ideology and the proper role
behavior of appellate court judges which became entangled in both
cases. No attempt will be made to recount in detail the chronology of
events, or to capture all dimensions of the respective nominations. The
basic picture is available in newspapers and congressional documents.
POLITICAL FACTORS
Here we will consider the timing of the nominations, the
nominating strategies of Presidents Hoover and Nixon, the patterns of
support and opposition, and the crucial role in each case of liberal
interest groups opposing confirmation.
The timing of both nominations appears significant. The
Haynsworth nomination was Nixon's second and came early in his
term of office. This is normally supposed to aid confirmation and
therefore highlights the strength and effectiveness of the opposition.
Hoover's nomination of Parker came later in the President's term,
when the so-called "honeymoon" with Congress (if there had been one
at all) had waned or concluded. Even more important, perhaps, is the
relationship of a nomination to the one that preceded it. Parker's
nomination took place shortly after the controversy over the
6. A. TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: Tnm CASE OF Louis D. BRANDEIS (1964). See also
H. Abraham & E. Goldberg, A Note on the Appointment of Justices of The Supreme
Court of The United States, 46 A.B.A.J. 147-50, 219-22 (1960); J. Thorpe, The
Appearance of Supreme Court Nominees Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 19 J.
PUB. L. 371-402 (1970); C. Black Jr. A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme
Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970).
1971]
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nomination of Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice.' Hughes was
confirmed, 62-26, but there had been a strong minority opposition
from Progressives led by Senator Norris of Nebraska. Hughes had
been attacked as a tool of capitalism and for dragging the Court
through the muck and mire of politics by resigning in 1916 to run for
President. Thus, when Parker's name was sent to the Senate there was
already controversy in the air as well as political opposition to the
President over ajudicial appointment. In the Haynsworth situation, the
previous nomination of Warren Burger as Chief Justice had been
confirmed with less protracted opposition. However, there had been
significant liberal dissatisfaction with the Burger appointment,
particularly over his views and past decisions on criminal procedure
matters, and this dissatisfaction by liberals was only exacerbated by
Haynsworth's selection. What appears to have polluted the atmosphere
of the Haynsworth nomination most, however, was less the Burger
nomination than the two battles over Abe Fortas-first over his
nomination as Chief Justice (eventually withdrawn by President
Johnson after the Senate failed to vote cloture against a filibuster), and
then over the conflict-of-interest charges which led to Fortas'
resignation in the spring of 1969. Thus, in both the Haynsworth and
Parker cases, frustration by opposition senators over a previously lost
fight against the confirmation of a preceding nominee seems to have
increased nominees' vulnerability to attack.
There is little doubt that Haynsworth's nomination-like that of
Judge Harold Carswell which followed Haynsworth's rejection-was
part of President Nixon's "southern strategy"-a maneuver widely
interpreted as a payoff for southern support in the 1968 election and a
down payment for continued southern support for Nixon in 1972. In
fact, two national columnists suggested that because of this strategy,
Attorney General Mitchell twice refused Haynsworth's request that his
name be withdrawn. 8 It is also possible that Parker's nomination
7. Hoover did not wait very long between the Hughes confirmation and Parker's
nomination, perhaps at most enough time to find a name, perform a background check,
and get proper clearance. Whether a delay, to let the cauldron's boil be calmed, would
have helped Parker is unclear. Certainly Nixon's longer wait after the Burger
confirmation before sending Haynsworth's name to the Senate did not perceptively aid
the latter.
8. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Haynsworth Court Affair: Did It Hurt
Mitchell's Stock, WIscoNsIN STATE JOURNAL, November 25, 1969. Judge Haynsworth
subsequently denied that he had made such arequest.
[Vol. 23
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resulted from the "southern strategy" of a Republican President.
While Hoover's Attorney General, also named Mitchell, in a
memorandum to the Senate Judiciary Committee did indicate that the
fact that the Fourth Circuit had not been represented on the Supreme
Court in many years played a part in Parker's selection, 9 he claimed
that a search for nominees had been made in several circuits, not all of
them southern. However, there subsequently was found in the Justice
Department's file on Parker a letter from a Department of the Interior
official, urging a seat for Parker in order to reward North Carolina and
the South for their electoral support of Hoover. 0 While we have no way
of knowing whether the earlier Attorney General Mitchell saw this
letter or gave it any weight, it is certainly not implausible to think that,
certainly the idea, if not the letter itself, carried weight in Hoover's
mind. Hoover himself, in his Memoirs, not only insisted that his
Attorney General had "zealously" demanded "quality and character
on the bench," but after noting that there was no Justice from the
South indicated that "regional distribution of justices had always been
regarded as of some importance.""
The degree to which a President is willing to fight for a nomination
is a crucial, though not necessarily conclusive, factor. Wilson's support
of Brandeis, the third most controversial nomination of the century,
may have been crucial in winning a close vote, while Lyndon Johnson's
support of Fortas as Chief Justice proved insufficient, and, in the
context of the charge of "cronyism" leveled against Fortas, positively
embarrassing. Hoover's Attorney General did support the Parker
nomination strongly, but Hoover himself appeared to maintain a "low
profile" during the controversy. On the other hand, Nixon, to whom a
"low profile" is often attributed, supported both the Haynsworth and
the later Carswell nominations actively. In both cases he was alleged to
have applied considerable pressures on wavering Republican senators
to support the leader of their party."
9. 72 CONG. REc. 8341, 42 (1930).
10. Letter from Joseph Dixon to Walter Newton, Id. at 8040.
11. 2 Tm ME oIRs OF HERBERT HOOVER 268 (Macmillan, 1952). We are indebted
to Mr. Donald Gregory for calling this to our attention. It has recently been suggested to
us that there has not been a Justice from the "Atlantic South" since Peter Daniel.
12. There is evidence in both cases that this pressure may have backfired or proved
counter-productive. There was considerable resentment against the tactics used in the
Haynsworth case. In pushing for support of Carswell, President Nixon sent a letter to
Senator Saxbe, a wavering Republican, indicating Nixon's belief that in refusing to
1971]
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Both Parker and Haynsworth were endorsed by the American Bar
Association, although the issue of judicial ethics caused some division
of lawyers generally over the Haynsworth nomination. In both cases,
sitting judges on other Courts were involved in supporting the
nominees.' 3 Parker was recommended by the district judges in his
circuit. The involvement of other judges in the Haynsworth case was
greater and more important. The ethical issue which later proved his
undoing (and which will be described subsequently) was first uncovered
several years before the nomination. An investigation by Chief Judge
Sobeloff at the behest of Attorney General Robert Kennedy cleared
Haynsworth of unethical conduct in the Darlington Mills case.' 4 Judge
Winter testified in Haynsworth's behalf, but conceded under
questioning that he might have handled differently the acquisition of
stock in a company whose case before his Court had already been
decided. The other members of Haynsworth's court sent a telegram of
endorsement to the Senate.
What the nominees did or did not do in their own behalf may also
be a relevant factor. Parker had been attacked for a statement he had
made in response to Democratic charges while Republican candidate
for Governor of North Carolina in 1920, a statement saying that
neither party wanted blacks to vote. Unlike Judge Carswell's television
disavowal of a youthful statement of racial supremacy, Parker made no
public disclaimers. He did, however, send a letter, read into the Senate
debate, in which he avowed that as a judge he would be fair to all,
regardless of race. A personal appearance before the Judiciary
Committee might have helped remove any doubts about his views on
the race issue, but such was not thecustom at the time and Parker did
not appear. Haynsworth was not faced with an off-the-court political
statement being used against him, but he appeared before the Judiciary
Committee personally in line with current custom. Whether
confirm Carswell after having also defeated Haynsworth, the Senate was denying the
President his prerogative to "appoint" members of the Supreme Court. Aside from the
fact, later admitted, that the President's position was constitutionally unsupportable, it
altered the debate from one on Carswell's qualifications to the prerogatives of the Senate
as an institution-and provoked costly Senate opposition to the nomination. The letter is
reprinted in 116 CONG. REc. 4937 (Daily ed., Apr. 2, 1970).
13. What little is known about the role of sitting judges in fostering or blocking
judicial appointments indicates that it may be of some importance. See J. GROSSMAN,
LAWYERS AND JUDGES: THE ABA AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION, 39-42
(1965).
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Haynsworth's appearances affected the votes of any senators on the
Committee is unclear, although it is probable that a refusal to meet
charges of unethical conduct-as opposed to charges of mere political
oratory-might well have been damaging.
GROUP PRESSURE AND IDEOLOGICAL OPPOSITION
The coalition of groups opposing both Parker and Haynsworth,
and the ideological policy basis for their opposition, provides perhaps
the strongest parallel between the two rejections. The principal
components of the coalition were the NAACP and organized labor,
joined in both cases by liberal progressive Republicans, and in the
Haynsworth case as well by conservative Republicans. In both
instances there was an element of political hostility toward the
nominating President which was difficult to separate from opposition
to the nominees themselves.
Both the NAACP and labor based their opposition to Parker on
single events-the former on Parker's aforementioned campaign
statement, the latter on a single decision known as the Red Jacket
case. 5 In this case, Parker had sustained an injunction against the Mine
Workers Union, thus affirming the validity of the so-called "yellow
dog" contract, in which a worker was forced to agree not to join a
union as a condition of employment. Neither Walter White of the
NAACP nor William Green of the American Federation of Labor
appeared to know more about Parker than these single events to which
they objected, nor had they known about Parker prior to his
nomination. In fact, the North Carolina labor group had first endorsed
Parker, either without knowing of, or in spite, of, the Red Jacket case.
In the Haynsworth case, labor seemed again to be basing its
opposition to the nominee on a single case, Darlington Mills, in which
Haynsworth's opinion upheld the right of the textile company
embroiled in a labor dispute to close its mill. The NAACP's opposition
to Haynsworth was somewhat more complicated; essentially it was that
he had not carried out the spirit of the Brown decision of 1954,16 but
had approved a variety of school desegregation plans designed to avoid
rather than promote integration. Again, we find some attorneys from
15. United Mine Workers v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal and Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839
(4th Cir. 1927).
16. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1971]
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labor unions and the NAACP in South Carolina saying, that
Haynsworth was a fair and honest judge."
In both the Parker and Haynsworth cases, there were underlying
reasons for NAACP and labor opposition which went beyond the
particular instances described. Indeed, opposition may have been as
much related to political circumstances in which these organizations
found themselves as to the nominees themselves. At the time of the
Parker nomination, both the NAACP and labor were far weaker than
they would become in subsequent decades, or than they are today. 1930
was still five years away from the Wagner Act and two years before the
Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction statute, and labor may have felt the
need to demonstrate publicly its growing political clout. Likewise, the
NAACP was still a fledgling organization in 1930, dependent largely
on white liberals, under attack from the Communist Party as being too
conservative and too establishment oriented. Its great legal victories
were still to come. Blocking the nomination of Parker was a major
symbolic victory for both groups and may help explain the effort they
put into the fight. The fight against Parker must also be seen as a
continuation of the liberal attack on a Court which had, in the 1920s, if
anything become more conservative and rigid on both economic and
racial issues.
While, by the time of the Haynsworth nomination, both groups
were stronger than they had been in 1930, both may have felt it
necessary to block his nomination to protect interests against which
they thought he would vote as a justice. Both labor and the NAACP
are groups with considerable influence in Democratic party circles, but
little with the Republicans under normal circumstances. Both may
have felt compelled to strike at least a symbolic blow against the
judicial fruits of Nixon's southern strategy. Frankly, to both groups
the prospect of a Republican President and a lot of old or sick justices
likely to retire or expire may have raised the spectre of the Supreme
Court, long the most liberal branch of government, moving
substantially toward the right and sabotaging the hard-won victories of
two generations. Unlike the Parker case, where opposition was
motivated in part by a desire to radically alter the conservative policies
of the Court, in the Haynsworth case it was a desperate effort to save
the Court's prevailing liberal policies from destruction.
17. Lawyers from the Textile Workers Union and Longshoremen's Union appeared
in behalf of Haynsworth. See 115 CONG. REc. 14548-49, 14763 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1969).
[Vol. 23
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The issue which raised the largest questions in the Haynsworth
battle was that which had driven Justice Fortas from the bench-the
financial relationships of a judge with corporations and individuals
involved in past or possible future litigation before him. Perhaps this
simply reflected a change in the times between 1930 and 1969. At the
time of Parker's nomination, the New York Times18 reported that a
question was likely to be raised concerning Parker's investments in
utility securities, but there appears to have been no follow-up on this
matter. Perhaps Parker was involved in some of the same sort of
business activity as was Haynsworth, with the issue not raised or
pursued because standards of judicial ethics were less strict thirty years
ago. Certainly, standards-for judges withdrawing from participation
in cases in which they may have any personal interest to the extent they
exist-have tightened in the intervening years, but the judge himself
remains the sole judge of the propriety of withdrawal in a particular
case. Unquestionably because of the recent controversy over the
business connections of Justice Fortas, Haynsworth's alleged lapses in
ethics loomed much larger than would normally have been the case. No
comparable scandal had preceded the Parker nomination. Charles
Evans Hughes had been accused of serving and being connected with
rich people's interests. To some this may have been prima facie
evidence of corruption or dishonesty; for most it was a different issue
entirely.
Assessing the precise role of the ethics controversy in the defeat of
Judge Haynsworth is difficult, if not impossible. There is no question
that initial opposition to Haynsworth had been partisan and
ideological. If left at that level Haynsworth would unquestionably have
been confirmed. But as in the case of Justice Fortas, those who sought
to block the nomination for political reasons began to uncover evidence
of a different sort, evidence which was much more damaging and which
converted many to opposition who had originally been expected to
support the nomination. Historically, few senators have articulated the
position that their function was to confirm a Supreme Court
nomination only if it was the best qualified man available. Most
senators have accepted the prerogative of the President in such matters
and have limited their opposition to those cases where it appeared the
18. The New York Times, March 22, 1930, at 18.
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nominee was completely unqualified, or where voting for the nominee
constituted a grave political risk. In the Haynsworth case, most
senators who announced and voted against the nomination publicly
attributed their opposition to the ethics issue. But it is a reasonably fair
speculation, in the absence of hard evidence to the contrary, that many
were using this as a convenient cover for ideological or political
opposition.
THE ROLE OF THE APPELLATE JUDGE
The matter of the role of a federal appellate judge became crucial
in both the Parker and Haynsworth nominations. In both cases, the
reader will remember, there were allegations that Parker and
Haynsworth were too conservative; defenders of Parker argued that the
controversial decisions did not indicate Parker's conservatism, but
only that he was following the law set down by the Supreme Court;
defenders of Haynsworth argued that he had not tried to obstruct or
evade compliance with the Brown decision, and that his key decisions in
school segregation cases, though later reversed, were an accurate
interpretation of Supreme Court policy at the time they were made.
Whether it is simply the job of an appellate judge to follow the
Supreme Court's ruling to the letter, or whether he should anticipate or
precede the Court to new doctrines is often debated. Because many
argue that a Court of Appeals judge is merely following the Supreme
Court, they would say one cannot determine his personal views from
such decisions. Others would argue that a lower court judge
should-and often does-disagree with the Court when his personal
values differ from those embodied in a controlling decision, and that
following a precedent to the letter is as often as not indicative of
substantive agreement with that precedent. Precedents, of course, are
not always clear, and a Court of Appeals judge is frequently "damned
if he does and damned if he doesn't."
When the Supreme Court precedents applying to a case before
lower federal judges are clear, those judges can know what is expected
of them. Whether they will follow the precedents may be another
matter. But what is not clear is what they should do regardless of the
clarity of the precedents, when it appears that the Supreme Court might
change its mind on a subject. In other words, lower federal judges must
face the question, "Should we anticipate what the Supreme Court
might do?" A noted judge, Calvert Magruder, has argued that, even
[Vol. 23
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though the lower court may be overruled for doing so, it should follow
clear precedent. But where no controlling precedent exists, matters are
less clear. Magruder suggests that judges can examine earlier Supreme
Court cases to see what their logical consequences might be, and can
utilize dicta in earlier cases in an effort to divine what the Supreme
Court would have done or would do in dealing with the problem. 9 On
the other hand, the lower court judges can assume that the Supreme
Court would find it more useful to have the lower court deal with the
case fully, to provide the Supreme Court with the benefit of its
thinking, regardless of past Supreme Court dicta. But there is no rule
to tell a lower court judge which strategy to use.
There is also the question of the Supreme Court opinion which
lower court judges feel to be unhelpful. Magruder speaks of situations
where Courts of Appeals have devoted much time to writing an
opinion, only to be reversed "in an opinion that strikes us as superficial
and hastily prepared.120 This the lower court judges would be less
inclined to follow, even if they would despite their awareness of the
pressures under which the Supreme Court operates. Similarly, when the
Supreme Court reverses without opinion after the lower courts have
devoted much thought to a subject, the judge may be tempted to act as
if the reversal hadn't occurred.
Serving to point up the effects of these situations is Paul Sanders'
comment that "[ilf the edict itself is uncertain, or if there is a question
as to whether the high court would itself now follow it, the possibility of
variation and flexibility in lower court action is multiplied
tremendously."'2 To Sanders' comment, Martin Shapiro adds, in
explaining differences in interpretation which arise between lower court
judges dealing with the same Supreme Court opinion: "The less clear
and direct the policy communication from the Supreme Court the more
likely are the resisting circuit judges to 'misunderstand' it and continue
along their own path." And he goes on to say, reinforcing earlier
discussion of the effects of ambiguity: "The clearer the message, the
higher the cost in ignoring or misunderstanding it."22
19. Magruder, The Trials and Tribulations of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 44
CORNELL L. REV. 7 (1968).
20. Id.
21. Sanders, The Warren Court and the Lower Federal Courts, in CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 426-427 (J. Schmidhauser ed. 1963).
22. M. SHAPIRO, THE SUPREM E COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 171 (1968).
1971]
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As this may suggest, the Supreme Court's rulings are only part of
the "generalized tensions" felt by the lower court judge, not the whole
directing force behind his work. The rulings create pressure in one
direction, but "much more specific pressure" may derive from the
emotions of the area to be affected by a decision. The federal judge is
open to those pressures because he is a resident of the district or circuit;
responsive to the social, economic and political values of the area, and
very likely a product in part of the local political party machinery (even
if not active in the party, his selection involved the party). While the
Supreme Court "represents" a national constituency, the federal
judges in the aftermath of Brown also shows that while "Judges will do
what they are told by the United States Supreme Court . . .none of
them . . . are particularly anxious to attack strongly entrenched local
institutions," and that "the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's
instructions has been resolved to conform to the dominant political
forces of the South."=
Lest we leave the opinion that all pressures are centrifugal and lead
the lower court judge away from the Supreme Court's rulings, and
that, other things being equal, lower court judges will NOT follow the
high court's rulings, we should make clear that this is not the case. We
find that many judges have in fact followed Supreme Court precedents
religiously. A recent study of Parker showed that in 64 of 72 cases,
Parker was consistent with the Supreme Court.2" In the eight cases
where he was not, seven had no controlling Supreme Court precedent,
leaving only one case of 72 in which he conflicted with the high court.
In his situation, compliance had high costs, because the decision for
which the labor unions attacked him, the Red Jacket case, was one in
which Parker had ruled on the authority of the Supreme Court's
holding in Hitchman Coal & Coke v. Mitchell., Whether the matter
was simply reliarce on a single case is not clear. Senator Borah, in
arguing against Parker's confirmation, not only said that the Red
Jacket injunction was too broad (e.g., that Parker had gone beyond
what precedent required of him), but claimed that Parker had ignored a
Supreme Court decision which came after, and limited, Hitchman
Coal26 This decision, American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central
23. J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 246 (1961).
24. W. Burris, John J. Parker and Supreme Court Policy: A Case Study in Judicial
Control, 1965 (Unpublished dissertation in University of North Carolina Library).
25. 245 U.S. 229 (1918).
26. 72 CONG. REC. 7937-38, 8037passim (1930).
[Vol. 23
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Trades Council,2Y was not mentioned at all by Parker in his Red Jacket
opinion. It can also be argued-in favor of the position that Parker was
anti-union and not simply an obedient lower court judge-that Parker
ignored the Clayton Act, passed after Hitchman Coal and limiting it,
although it should be remembered that the Supreme Court severely
limited the labor protection provided in that statute.2
With Haynsworth, there was controversy in the areas of labor
relations and desegregation. The issue in the former rested on
Haynsworth's decision in Darlington Mills. Sen. Hollings (D-S.C.)
argued that Haynsworth's vote in favor of the company followed
existing Supreme Court doctrine at the time, although the Supreme
Court changed the rules in reversing Haynsworth when the latter's
decision was appealed." Pressing the attack on Haynsworth as an anti-
union judge, Sen. Metcalf (D-Mont.) argued that when the Supreme
Court reversed Haynsworth in labor-management cases, it did so
unanimously in all cases but one." While we do not have comparable
data for Parker, the difference in the situation of the two nominees-
presuming for the moment that both were equally anti-labor-
may be that Parker was dealing with a conservative Supreme
Court, while the Supreme Court to which Haynsworth's decisions were
appealed was clearly liberal in the area of labor law. On this basis,
Parker should have had an easier time following the Supreme Court's
doctrine. However, Burris' figures, which deal with a wide range of
subjects, not just labor relations cases, reinforce the position that
Parker was an obedient follower of the Court and not necessarily more
conservative.
The problem of a fast-moving Supreme Court most clearly
affected Haynsworth in the area of race relations. He was operating,
along with all his brethren in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, in
an area where the Supreme Court finally-fed up with slow response to
its ambiguous "with all deliberate speed" order of Brown I-had
begun to move quickly in the late 1960's. This means that the Supreme
Court found some of the rulings from the Fourth Circuit (as well as
from the other Circuits) to be defective, and overruled them. Whether
this made Haynsworth a "heel-dragging" segregationist is another
27. 257 U.S. 184 (1922).
28. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
29. 115 CONG. REc. 14540 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1969).
30. Id. at 14468.
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matter.3' If one compares his position with that of his judicial brethren
at the time he made his particular decisions, rather than with the
Supreme Court's reversals at a later date, one finds Haynsworth not
notably out of line, and certainly not lagging behind what the Supreme
Court appeared to be saying, which was, on a number of the issues
involved, very little.
Again, how one evaluates this performance depends on whether
one expects a lower court judge to anticipate the Supreme Court and to
move in advance of it or not. Haynsworth was not notably reluctant to
lead the court in other areas of the law; his innovative decision on the
right of prisoners to have convictions reviewed on habeas corpus was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Peyton v. Rowe.32 Those supporting
him also pointed to his order desegregating the North Carolina Dental
Society3 as an instance of "judicial statesmanship." One might easily
conclude that Haynsworth's reluctance to anticipate pro-school
integration decisions of the Supreme Court reflected his personal
policy preferences rather than his desire to be an obedient judge. His
record is devoid of any evidence of outright disobedience to the Brown
decision, but it is also devoid of evidence of real acceptance of the
principle or spirit of that decision. In his favor it must be said that it
took the Supreme Court 14 years to decide-without using the word,
considered inflammatory by some-that the Brown decision required
positive results of integration, rather than a mere dismantling of the
legal barriers to integration,u and 15 years to require school districts to
proceed in this direction without further "deliberate speed."
There is a last interesting irony which ties the Parker and
Haynsworth nominations-and rejections-together. Judge Parker
remained on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals long after his
rejection for the Supreme Court, and became Chief Judge of the
Circuit. He was a member of the special three-judge Court which heard
31. -or, in the words of Senator Clifford Case, one who showed "persistent
reluctance to accept, and considerable legal ingenuity to avoid" the mandate of Brown
and other similar cases. 115 CONG. REc. 14,768 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1969). For a more
sympathetic view of Haynsworth's handling of school desegregation cases, see the
statement by Professor G.W. Foster, architect of the "HEW Guidelines," to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, reprinted in 115 CONG. REC. 14,493-97 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1969).
32. 383 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967), affirmed, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
33. See Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Society, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966).
34. Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
35. Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
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the case of Briggs v. Elliott.3 6 Parker cast the deciding vote rejecting the
contention of the NAACP that exclusion of Negroes from the white
schools violated the 14th amendment per se, and in any case did not
meet the constitutional standard of "separate-but-equal. 3 7 His
decision was technically in compliance with existing law, but clearly a
"foot-dragging" operation which ignored the thrust of Sweat v.
Painter,'3 decided in 1950, which foreshadowed the repudiation of
Plessy v. Ferguson9 in the Brown decision. Briggs v. Elliott was one of
the quintet of cases decided under the label of Brown, and the decision
was reversed and remanded to the Fourth Circuit. Interpreting the
Brown decision as strictly as possible, Parker wrote in the remand of
the Briggs case, "The Constitution. . .does not require integration. It
merely forbids discrimination." 4 While Parker did not live long
enough to qualify the thrust of that statement, which long hung over the
Circuit,4 it was Judge Haynsworth who finally put the restrictive
reading of Brown to rest.
42
36. 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
37. When the suit was commenced, the inferiority of the Negro schools was so
obvious that attorneys for the school board conceded the point. They based their defense
on the contention that a program had already begun to bring the Negro schools up to the
prevailing standards of the white schools. In 1951, Negroes constituted nearly 75% of the
population, and also of the school population of the county, but Negro schools received
only 40% of the school expenditures. The average expenditure per Negro child was $43,
and for each white child, $166. But the NAACP's contention went beyond seeking
equalization of facilities. The objective was to show that segregated schools were per se
inferior and psychologically damaging to the Negro children. The three judge federal
court split, 2-1. Parker and Judge Timmerman held ihat efforts to bring the Negro
schools up to the white standard satisfied constitutional requirements. Judge Waring
argued in dissent that segregation was inconsistent with equality and that it was
unconstitutional.
38. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
39. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
40. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
41. On this point see Judge Sobeloff's concurrence in Bowman v. County School
Board of Charles County, Virginia, 382 F.2d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 1967).
42. Green v. County School Board of New Kent, 382 F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1967).
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